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JUR]SDICIION SI ATEMENT 
' J' 1 i i s a p p e a 1 i s i r o n i 11 :i c I: i i i d i n p s o I' I: a c t C o i :i c) i :i s i o i i s o f 1 a v a I i d O i d e i e i :i t e i z d 
oi i October 6, 2009. The Utah Supreme Coui t ) las jurisdiction over this appeal pursuai it 
to 1Jtah Code Ann § 78A-3-102(3)0) (West 2009). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. a. Issue: Did liic UJMJJCI ^OUI I correctly conclude ll lat IJK ; :•<;;• 
exemption found in article XIII. §3(1 )(i) oft! :ie I Jtal i Consliti itioi i was i :iol In nited to 
irrigatioi i for agricultt iral purposes? 
b. Stai idai d :)f i e\ ie\ ': 1 1 lis issi le presei its a qi icsl i :: r i • :)f la" < ' , \ ( - I lid :i is 
reviewed for correctness. See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 Ul i i . , l i ,
 v ^ i^ i 
2003),., • 
c. D e t e n i n. r itii n h rvv: 1 Jl, nil Cc [III , § 3(1 ) ( i ) ; I It. il Cc »ck \ i ii i. §59™ 2 -
1111 (2009). 
2. a. Issue: Did the district coi irt err ii i concluding that the taxatioi i of Summit 
Watei 's 'at- : J iisti il: i itic i i 1 a :ilities a s personal property does not constitute 
impermissible double taxatioiici 
b. Standard of review: 1 'his issi le presents a mixed question of law and fact. 
which is reviewcil 1«#r correctness. See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 
(Utah :*>"' *). 
c. • Determinative law: Utah Const., art. XIII, S ^ , J . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summit Water is a nonprofit, mutual water company that provides water to its 
shareholders for household and irrigation use. Summit County assessed personal 
property taxes against Summit Water's water distribution facilities, consisting of 
pumping stations, underground storage facilities, well houses, and water pipelines 
("water distribution facilities").1 Due to the structure of Summit Water as a nonprofit, 
mutual water company, those personal property taxes would be paid by the shareholders 
who are also the consumers of water from Summit Water. Those same items were taxed 
to Summit Water and to its shareholders both through the value added to their property 
by reason of the availability of water and as improvements included in the value of their 
real property. 
Summit Water appealed the assessment to the Board of Equalization for Summit 
County, on the grounds that: (i) the water distribution facilities were improvements to 
real property and could not be taxed as personal property; (ii) the water distribution 
facilities qualified for the constitutional irrigation exemption to the extent that they were 
used for irrigation purposes; and (iii) taxing the water distribution facilities as both 
personal and real property constituted impermissible double taxation. 
After Summit County denied Summit Water's appeal, Summit Water appealed to 
the Tax Commission. The Tax Commission upheld the assessment and Summit Water 
1
 In Summit Water v. Summit County 2005 UT 73, ^ 4, this Court recognized that the 
County's imposition of the personal property tax at issue on Summit Water was part of its 
concerted activities in violation of the antitrust laws as alleged in that case. That case 
continues. 
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appealed f : ) III ic Disti ict Coi n t " 1 1 le Disli ict Court, reverse*.: •!••.. T.°v nmi i i , , ^ ion. 
exempt from taxation ,c thu cMu.i the) were ubed lor irngat^-n purposes. Ihe ; ^ ^ n 
found the extent of irrigation use to be 51% based on the evidence presented. S\ :i:i i n nit 
( "01 inty ai i :l tl \> z I ax Coi i :ii i l i ss ioi i 1 la \ e appeal zd :)ii ill!;; ' t l )• z i i ilu ig tl iat Si u i u i lit v \ atei \s 
facilities are exempt from taxation undei the irrigation exemption to m. 
Constiiution The DNirki C.^nr upheld the T.i\ Commission's decision that taxation •••*-
the water di . i\\.: . :. ., ',vs i. : personal . .. ] ^ ^ p e ^ v did ^o* cor^WM1" 
]j)ipennjsbiOi i« = 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Sumn Jistribution Company ("Summit Wifc r ' n - ~ TU~L-
2. Summit Water's Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation establish 
Summit Water's corporate purpose as "the installation and operation of a general culinary 
• . •? use and bene til of the shareholders ». ^ 
corporation. i^v ai /4z.) 
3. \ " v Summit Water provided domestic and irrigation water service to 
approximate! . vidual residences and businesses. (R at 2080 ^]11.) 
2
 This appeal was first assigned to Judge De ver of the Third District Court. After 
briefing and argument Judge Dever issued an opinion on two of the three issues before 
the court, finding that the facilities taxed were improvements to real property and not 
taxable as personal property and that the tax was not double taxation. (R. at 1608.) 
Judge Dever reserved the issue of the irrigation exemption for further consideration. 
Thereafter, Judge Dever without explanation withdrew his opinion and, upon inquiry, 
recused himself from the case. 
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4. 51% of the water delivered to Summit Water's shareholders is used for 
irrigation purposes, including watering gardens, orchards, meadows, pastures, lawns, 
shrubs, and trees. (R. at 2080 1)12.) 
5. Once a share of water from Summit Water is attached to a particular parcel 
of property it becomes appurtenant thereto, and the water right cannot be sold or 
transferred separate from the property. (R. at 2080 1(8.) 
6. The By-laws of Summit Water provide for assessments of Class A, B, C 
and D stock in such a manner as to directly allocate increased separate costs (individual 
costs) to the shareholder causing such increased costs. For example, shareholders 
seeking a connection are assessed the costs of connection fees, and shareholders whose 
lands lie at higher elevations and require pumping are assessed the additional costs of 
pumping. (R. at 2082^21.) 
7. A shareholder proposing an expansion to the system must pay for the costs 
of the expansion. Upon completion of the expansion, the affected shares of stock become 
appurtenant to the project and thereafter are sold and conveyed as an appurtenance to the 
project. (R. at 316.) 
8. Summit Water provides water to properties where, for the most part, there 
is no municipal water source available. Without water these properties could not be 
developed for either residential or commercial purposes. (R. at 2080 ^10.) 
9. Real property in Summit County that has appurtenant water rights and a 
water supply to the property available for use has a significantly higher fair market value 
than real property that has no water, with all other property characteristics being equal. 
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T - • ".creases the va '% or more over a s in^a lot 
without water. (R. at 2082 1|20.) 
-<cal P M H I ! \ iaxo- in Sinmn:: i . ap{\ are based on a tax rate multiplied by 
the assessed vi..^ inc. ua property The assessed value is based on the fair market 
> "'"all le of tl le 1 eal pi opei (y. "1 1 le 1 iipl ici tl le as ,s< asaa ad ^ 'alu< \ ll :ic i i IOI e tl :ie pi c pei ty : :;| > :n ICI 
p a y s in r ea l p r o p e r t y l ax . (R. at 2 1 4 7 p p . 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 . , * i . ..,., 
1 1 . B e c a u s e of the » n iq iu ^ t n i c l m i <• r a rnuiaa] -^AW* K m-pai^ am personal 
pi npulv Lixis. t • • • .-i-'iy passed 
through to Summit Water's shareholders. ^R. ai 2083 ^22.) 
^ p o n a : ^ a > . a s n ~- • a \ ' *"•* . ,*-- •..iri':M>ld.:r' • -.a\ . 
proportionate share aa company's assets . av * ^ 
1 . 
water storage facilities "ior ano un bc!;al: el ib i-Jiareholders."1 (R. at 2080 T]l4.) 
Si immit Water's "water rights, water soi irce capacity, storage facilities and 
) 
o^:«„n -Aale; Lm, ~. ,ca^i oevui parcels oi real property containing its 
water distribution facilities. Those properties are taxed as real property by Summit 
I I  11 in i h I in. i M i l l m i 11 in ill I ill in nil I I L i il <i. in I  in in in I | I ' ml "II IK i 1| " (i I I h e I mi" m a t l a i v a l u e n l 
those properties, and nroper t i c M T V H I In "111111m111II W ilhnii mil n n i i n i Ii, ill 
shareholders, includes the value of the water distribution facilities appurtenai,i ^
 UJu,v 
properties. 
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16. A substantial portion of Summit Water's water nights are judicially decreed 
and State Engineer-approved irrigation-use water rights. (R. at 244 ^8.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court properly found that the irrigation exemption for water facilities 
in Article XIII Section 2 Paragraph 5 of the Utah Constitution applies to facilities used 
for the artificial watering of land, and is not restricted, as argued by the Tax Commission, 
only to the artificial watering of lands for growing agricultural crops. First, the 
Constitutional exemption is clear and its plain language places no restriction on the use of 
the facilities other than that they must be "owned and used . . . for irrigating land . . . ." 
Utah Const., art. XIII, § 2. To impose an "agriculture" limitation on that exemption 
would be beyond the plain language of the exemption and contrary to the principles of 
constitutional interpretation. 
Second, even if the Court were to look to the meaning of "irrigation" in an 
historical context as advocated by the Tax Commission, the law of Utah has 
unequivocally recognized that "irrigation" means far more than watering agricultural 
crops and extends to the artificial watering of land for aesthetic as well as commercial 
agricultural purposes. E.g., Rohwer v. Chadwick, 26 P. 1116 (Utah 1891); Mt. Olivet 
Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 235 P. 876 (Utah 1925); In re Gen. Determination of 
Water Rights, 2004 UT 67, 98 P.3d 1. Contrary to the Tax Commission's arguments, 
there is no Utah case restricting the term "irrigation" to a commercial or agricultural 
purpose. 
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Third, even looking outside Utah case law there is nothing to restrict the term 
irrigation as advocated by the Tax Commission. Aside from the questionable relevance 
of the inquiry, looking at the various definitions of irrigation found in cases, books and 
treatises reveals a generally broad historical definition of that term, encompassing the 
watering of lands for a variety of purposes including, but certainly not limited to. 
agriculture. 
The Tax Commission urges this Court to impose a condition on the irrigation 
exemption to the Utah Constitution found nowhere in the language of the Constitution 
and unsupported by the decisions of this Court. That request must be rejected. 
In addition, the district court failed to recognize the double taxation to the Summit 
Water shareholders that would attend the personal property tax Summit County sought to 
impose. The district court found that the facilities the county sought to tax were 
improvements to real property. No appeal was taken from that decision. Those facilities 
have therefore already been taxed as part of the real property on which they are situated 
and in the value added to the properties, owned exclusively by Summit Water 
shareholders, provided with water. The personal property tax would be paid by those 
same Summit Water shareholders. The Utah Constitution does not permit such double 
taxation. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMIT WATER'S WATER DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES QUALIFY 
FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL IRRIGATION EXEMPTION 
A. The Water Distribution Facilities Are Used For "Irrigating Land." 
The Utah Constitution provides a tax exemption for water facilities to the extent 
they are used to deliver water to irrigate lands within the state. 
Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, 
transmission lines, pipes, and flumes owned and used by individuals or 
corporations for irrigating land within the state owned by such 
individuals or corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be 
exempted from taxation to the extent that they shall be owned and used 
for such purposes. 
Utah Const., art. XIII, § 2 (emphasis added). The enabling statute then in effect, section 
59-2-1111, is virtually the same as the constitutional provision. 
Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, 
transmission lines, pipes, and flumes owned and used by individuals or 
corporations for irrigating land within the state owned by those 
individuals or corporations, or by the individual members of the 
corporation, are exempt from taxation to the extent that they are 
owned and used for irrigation purposes. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1111 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the Tax Commission's argument, nothing within the plain language of 
the irrigation exemption limits its application to purely "agricultural" uses. The 
exemption applies simply and "to the extent" that water systems are used "for irrigating 
land." 
611 :429705v3 & 
B. The Plain Meaning of '"Irrigation" Includes All Artificial Watering of 
Land. 
The starting point for the Court's analysis of the scope of the irrigation exemption 
is the text itself. Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57 ^29, 52 P.3d 1148 ("In 
interpreting the state constitution, we look primarily to the language of the constitution 
itself") "The rule which should be applied is that laws, and especially foundational laws 
such as our Constitution, should be interpreted and applied according to the plain 
import of their language as it would be understood by persons of ordinary 
intelligence and experience." In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Young). 1999 UT 6. 
]^60 (Utah 1999) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). "In construing 
constitutional as well as statutory provisions, it is to be assumed that the words used 
were chosen advisedly, and terms should be given an interpretation and an application in 
accord with their commonly understood meaning." Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 
673, 675 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). 
If the constitutional provision is clear, "then extraneous or contemporaneous 
construction may not be resorted to." Id. (quoting University of Utah v. Board of 
Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348, 361 (Utah 1956). "We need not inquire 
beyond the plain meaning of the [constitutional provision] unless we find it 
ambiguous." Grand County, 2002 UT 57 ^29 (emphasis added).3 
3
 According to Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), the reason for the rule 
prohibiting extraneous or contemporaneous construction of facially plain and 
unambiguous constitutional provisions is that the rule "prevents judges from 'finding5 an 
ambiguity in even the most plain language of a constitutional or statutory provision as an 
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The language of the irrigation exemption is clear and unambiguous. By its own 
terms, this provision exempts from taxation certain property simply to the extent that it is 
used for the purpose of "irrigating land within the state." Utah Const., art. X11I. § 2. The 
plain meaning of the term "irrigation" as commonly understood is the artificial watering 
of land. (R. at 2102.) As set forth in detail below, the use of the term "irrigation" in Utah 
case law aptly demonstrates this. The text of the irrigation exemption does not limit the 
exemption to any particular irrigation use or purpose. It makes no distinction whatsoever 
between commercial versus residential use, agricultural versus horticultural or pastoral 
use, or between the use of irrigation for sustenance versus beautification. It applies 
generally and broadly to any irrigation use, without regard to the purpose for that 
irrigation. That is the plain meaning of the provision and the plain import of the language 
as would be understood by persons of ordinary intelligence and experience. 
Nevertheless, the Tax Commission contends that the exemption must be read as 
limited only to "agricultural" irrigation. Yet, nowhere within the text of the irrigation 
exemption is there any limitation whatsoever to a specific irrigation purpose—let alone to 
agricultural purposes only. Had the drafters intended to limit application of the irrigation 
exemption solely to agricultural irrigation, they very easily and plainly could have done 
so by simply inserting the word "agricultural" before the word "purposes" in the last 
sentence. They did not do so. Therefore, the Court must presume that the drafters chose 
excuse to search the legislative history in an attempt to justify an interpretation they 
prefer." Id at 850 n. 14. 
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the words and phrases used therein carefully and advisedly and not restrict the exemption 
beyond the plain language of the constitution. See Nephi City, 779 P.2d at 675. 
Because the plain meaning of the irrigation exemption is clear on its face, the 
Court need not, and indeed cannot, delve into extraneous materials in an attempt to 
discern the hearts and minds of the drafters. The district court did not find that the 
irrigation exemption was ambiguous, nor has the Tax Commission argued that it is. 
Rather, the Tax Commission has ignored the plain meaning of the text and instead 
jumped straight into extraneous and contemporaneous materials in an attempt to find 
support for its proposed construction. This is improper. Because the plain meaning of 
the term "irrigation" is clear and unambiguous, the inquiry ends there. 
C. Contemporaneous and Extraneous Materials Do Not Support the Tax 
Commission's Interpretation of the Irrigation Exemption. 
Even if the Court were to determine that the text of the irrigation exemption was 
ambiguous, contemporaneous and extraneous sources clearly demonstrate that the term 
"irrigation" has not been restricted solely to agricultural irrigation. The plain and 
ordinary meaning of the term "irrigation," as used by courts and legislatures throughout 
the history of Utah, has encompassed all artificial watering of land without regard to the 
specific purpose for irrigating the land. 
1. Utah Case Law 
Contrary to the Tax Commission's claim, Utah case law clearly shows that the 
term "irrigation" has historically been used in a very broad sense to refer generally to the 
artificial watering of land. In fact, as noted by the district court, the Utah Supreme Court 
611 :429705v3 11 
has used the term "irrigation** in a wide variety of contexts to refer to the watering of 
crops on a large farm, the watering of vegetables in a household garden, the watering of 
pastures for stock, the watering of grass and shade trees in one's yard, and even the 
watering of ornamental vegetation in a cemetery. (R. at 2102.) 
a. Early cases 
In Rohwer v. Chadwick. 26 P. 1116 (Utah 1891), a case decided just five years 
before enactment of the irrigation exemption, the Utah Supreme Court used the term 
"irrigate" in the following context: 
The evidence tended to prove that plaintiff lived on Fisher creek; had a 
farm there, used the water of the same for irrigating purposes on her farm, 
to irrigate her meadow land and her crops and garden and orchard 
and shade-trees . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). If, as the Tax Commission contends, the ordinary and accepted 
meaning of the term "irrigation" in the late 1800s encompassed only agricultural 
irrigation for raising food crops, then the Utah Supreme Court would not have used the 
term so broadly to apply to the watering of land for far more diverse purposes, including 
for purposes of cultivating "meadow land" and "shade-trees". The fact that it did so, 
directly contradicts the Tax Commission's argument. 
Numerous additional cases from the late 1800s likewise show common and 
generic usage of the term "irrigation" to refer to the watering of land, without any inquiry 
or consideration whatsoever by the Court into its intended use. See, e.g., Munroe v. I vie, 
2 Utah 535 (Utah 1880) (referring to "artificial irrigation" without consideration of 
purpose of irrigation); Levy v. Salt Lake City, 1 P. 160, 165 (Utah 1881) (referring to 
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"water used to irrigate land adjacent" without analysis of purpose of irrigation); Stowell 
v. Johnson, 26 P. 290 (Utah 1891) (referring to "irrigation of land" with no analysis of 
the purposes for "irrigating"); Holman v. Pleasant Grove City. 30 P. 72 (Utah 1892) 
(referring to "irrigation of plaintiffs land" without consideration of purpose for 
irrigation). In fact, there is not a single Utah case using the term "irrigation" in the 
narrow sense of agricultural food production. Without exception, the early case law 
refers to "irrigation" in its broad, generic sense of any artificial watering of land for any 
purpose. The Tax Commission's argument to the contrary simply does not square with 
early Utah case law. 
b. Mt. Olivet Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City 
Notably, in another early case, Mt. Olivet Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City. 235 
P. 876 (Utah 1925), the Utah Supreme Court, repeatedly used the term "irrigation" to 
refer to the watering of land for non-agricultural purposes. Specifically, the Court noted 
that commencing in about 1860 the water in dispute had used by certain residents "for 
the irrigation, through surface ditches, of their city lots." Id. at 876 (emphasis added). 
The Court further found that since 1874 when the cemetery was established the water had 
used "for the irrigation of the cemetery grounds." Id, at 876-77. 
A portion of it is in lawn grass, ornamental shrubbery and trees, and the 
remainder is in process of being similarly cultivated. Rows of trees have 
been set out around the exterior boundaries, and the whole area had been 
planted with crops and irrigated at times pursuant to the purpose of 
4
 None of the early cases cited by the Tax Commission stands for the proposition that the 
term "irrigation" has been used historically to mean only agricultural irrigation. To the 
contrary, each of these cases merely demonstrates that agriculture was but one purpose 
for irrigation. 
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ornamenting and beautifying the whole area as a burial ground. We think 
the evidence warrants the conclusion that the appropriation of the cemetery 
association was for the irrigation of the entire area of 70 acres. There is 
a [sic] considerable opinion evidence in the record upon the duty of water 
for irrigation of the cemetery grounds. . . . 
Id. at 203-04 (emphasis added). "[T]he irrigation of the city lots referred to and the 
cemetery grounds" continued for 35 years until 1909 when the cemetery acquired another 
50 acres and "water from the source in controversy was used beneficially for the 
irrigation of the 70 acres of cemetery grounds . . . ." Ld. at 876-77. The Court concluded 
that the cemetery had beneficially used the water at issue for irrigation of its 70 acres, 
finding that the 1 cubic foot of water would serve an area of 55 to 90 acres. Id. at 203-04. 
In order to find the use of the water "reasonably necessary" for the irrigation of the 70 
acres the Court stated: 
It is conceded that the irrigation of lawn grass, flowers, ornamental 
shrubbery and trees such as grown in a cemetery requires a somewhat 
greater quantity of water than ordinary agricultural crops. 
Id. at 204 (emphasis added). That statement makes clear that irrigation extended beyond 
the agricultural limitation the Tax Commission seeks to impose. The Tax Commission 
directly acknowledged in its district court brief that irrigating a cemetery was not an 
agricultural purpose. (R. at 1574.) In doing so, the Tax Commission admits that Mt. 
Olivet contradicts its position that the word "irrigation" in the late 1800s referred only to 
agricultural irrigation. 
The Tax Commission's various attempts to distinguish Mt. Olivet are unavailing. 
The Tax Commission first sought to distinguish Mt. Olivet in the district court by arguing 
that the case merely stands for the proposition that "water used for land occupied for the 
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dearly departed is not the same as water used for land occupied by the living who 
personally care for their own lawns, trees, gardens and shrubbery." (R. at 1474.) In 
doing so. the Tax Commission conceded that the irrigation exemption was not limited to 
only agricultural irrigation but also to the irrigation of cemeteries. The Tax 
Commissions interpretation of Mt. Olivet would therefore mean that the constitutional 
irrigation exemption must be construed as limited to both agricultural irrigation and to the 
irrigation of land occupied by cemeteries; however, land occupied by living people would 
be ineligible for the exemption if not used for agricultural food production. It goes 
without saying that there is no basis in Utah law or common sense for such a distinction. 
The Tax Commission has taken a different approach to Mt. Olivet before this 
Court. Now, the Tax Commission argues that the Court's use of the term "irrigation" in 
Mt. Olivet is irrelevant because the case did not specifically construe the irrigation 
exemption. (Tax Comm'n Appellate Br. at 13.) First, it is clear from the decision that 
the appropriation of the water at issue was tied to its irrigation use, first for city lots and 
later for the cemetery grounds. Second, the Tax Commission's argument flies in the face 
of its claim that the word "irrigation" must be read in its historical context and that the 
drafters of the irrigation exemption selected that term "irrigation" based on its historical 
meaning. The Mt. Olivet case and the prior Utah Supreme Court case law are directly 
relevant to the issue of what the term "irrigation" meant historically in Utah. 
Furthermore, the Tax Commission's purported objection to the Mt. Olivet case is 
curious given its own reliance on Utah case law and copies of old dictionaries and books 
as evidence of the historical meaning of the term "irrigation." None of these materials 
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deal at all with the use of the term "irrigation7" in the context of the irrigation exemption 
in the Utah Constitution. The Tax Commission cannot have it both ways. It cannot rely 
on materials showing the use of the term "irrigation" outside of the context of the 
property tax exemption while rejecting the use of that term in Mt. Olivet and prior Utah 
Supreme Court case law on that basis. It cannot claim an historical meaning for the term 
"irrigation'* that is different from its plain meaning, and then refuse to consider all 
evidence of the historical meaning of that word, including the plentiful Utah case law 
demonstrating far broader use of the term "irrigation" than merely agricultural irrigation. 
c. In re Gen. Determination of Water Rights 
The historical meaning of the term "irrigation" in the case law as defining any 
artificial watering of land has continued to the present time. In a recent case, In re Gen. 
Determination of Water Rights, 2004 UT 67, 98 P.3d 1, the Utah Supreme Court 
considered whether the water at issue had been put to beneficial use in irrigation and held 
that watering "natural vegetation on the property" was an irrigation use and constituted a 
beneficial use of the irrigation water right at issue. Id. at ffl| 15, 54. The Court agreed 
with the district court that the "irrigation [of natural vegetation] produced the benefits of, 
'among others,' 'satisfying aesthetic desires,' 'reducing the fire hazard,' and 'creating 
property line buffers.'" Id. at 1^ 53. The Court held that this was a beneficial, irrigation 
use of the owner's irrigation water right and rejected the challenge to those rights for 
non-use. Id. at^j 54. 
In short, the Tax Commission's claim that the term "irrigation" has been used 
historically to refer only to the watering of agricultural crops is without support. Its claim 
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is directly contradicted by the historical use of that term throughout the case law From 
at least 1881 through the present time, the case law consistently shows broad usage of the 
term "irrigation" to describe any artificial watering of land, regardless of purpose In 
fact, there is not a single case in Utah limiting the use of the term "irrigation* to 
agricultural use 
d. Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne 
The primary case relied upon by the Tax Commission in support of its errant 
position is Holliday Water Co v Lambourne. 466 P 2d 371 (Utah 1970) However this 
case simply does not say what the Tax Commission claims it does 
At issue in Holliday Water was simply whether use of water for domestic culinary 
purposes qualified as an "irrigation" use under the old irrigation exemption The older, 
then m effect version of the irrigation exemption required that water systems be used 
"exclusively" for irrigation purposes in order to qualify for the exemption It was this 
exclusivity requirement that was at issue in Holliday Water because the plaintiff water 
company supplied water for both outdoor irrigation use and indoor domestic use The 
water company argued that the irrigation exemption applied to the "artificial diversion of 
water for any useful purpose," including indoor domestic use, despite the then-existing 
requirement that it be used "exclusively" for "irrigating land " IdL at 372 The trial court 
rightly rejected this argument, concluding that the irrigation exemption was "strictly 
limited to property used exclusively for irrigating lands " Id Because indoor domestic 
use of water did not constitute "irrigating land," the water company was not supplying 
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water "exclusively" for "irrigating land" and therefore did nol qualify for the exemption 
Id, at 373. 
The Holliday Water Court never reached the issue of whether the watering of 
lawns, shrubs, and shade trees was included within the meaning of the term "irrigating 
land." In fact, the issue of whether "irrigating land" included nonagricultural irrigation 
was irrelevant to the case because the water company was not supplying the water 
"exclusively" for outdoor irrigation use but also for indoor domestic use. Because it was 
not, the inquiry ended there. Had the Court reached this issue, its research surely would 
have uncovered Mt. Olivet and the abundant Utah case law dating back to the 1880s. 
wherein the term "irrigation" was used broadly to encompass all artificial watering of 
land without regard to its purpose. 
Much has been made at the various stages of these proceedings of the citation to 
the definition of "irrigation" in the 1970 edition of American Jurisprudence in Holliday 
Water. Because the Court did not quote the treatise, it is impossible to tell from the case 
exactly what that 1970s-era treatise said. However, the Holliday Water Court cited to the 
treatise as defining "irrigation" as the "the artificial watering of agricultural land in 
regions where the rainfall is insufficient for crops; the ordinary and popular conception 
denotes the application of water to land for the production of crops and embraces all 
artificial watering of land." IdL at 372-73. The Tax Commission seized on the first part 
of that definition as evidence that "irrigation" is limited to the water of agricultural land, 
while Summit Water has emphasized the latter part of the definition which says that the 
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"ordinary and popular conception'" of the term irrigation "embraces all artificial watering 
of land." 
In reality, this citation is of little probative value. First it demonstrates, at best, 
what one author apparently understood to be the definition of "irrigation" in 1970, which 
was 75 years after enactment of the irrigation exemption. In fact, the current edition of 
American Jurisprudence includes a far broader definition of "irrigation" than that 
promoted by the Tax Commission—one that is not limited to agricultural use and 
specifically rejects the idea that irrigation is tied to agricultural use: 
The term "irrigation" ordinarily denotes the application of water to land for 
the production of crops. The diversion of water for the purpose of irrigation 
contemplates that something will be grown. The terms "irrigation" and 
"agricultural use" are not synonymous or coextensive, where the 
applicable statute favors agricultural use. However, "irrigationM need not 
be narrowly construed, and may include providing moisture for plant 
growth in sloughs and marshlands to provide a habitat for waterfowl, and 
water used for frost protection. 
45 Am. Jur. 2d Irrigation § 1 (2010) (emphasis added). 
Second, the 1970 citation to American Jurisprudence is ambiguous at best and 
contradictory at worst. The original language is not quoted in the Holliday Water case 
and terms such as "agricultural land" are not defined. Finally, the citation is mere dicta 
on an issue not before the Court and, given the aforementioned shortcomings, has no 
precedential value whatsoever. 
The Holliday Water case likewise has little application to the present dispute. 
Summit Water is not claiming that the irrigation exemption applies to indoor domestic 
use of its water, and the current version of the irrigation tax exemption applies simply "to 
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the extent that" water distribution facilities are used to "irrigate land " This 1970 case is 
not on point, not relevant to the issue before this Court, and of no probative value in 
determining the historical meaning of a term chosen nearly 100 years earlier by the 
drafters of the constitutional irrigation tax exemption 5 
e. Beneficial Use 
Much of the Utah case law involving the term "irrigation" is in the context of 
water rights and. specifically, whether a water right is being used for irrigation, domestic, 
or other purposes A recent example is In re Gen Determination of Water Rights, 2004 
UT 67, 98 P.3d 1. in which this Court considered whether a particular irrigation water 
right was subject to forfeiture because the water had not been beneficially used. In that 
case the water right in question had been changed in approximately 1981 from an historic 
domestic use to an irrigation use through a change application filed with the state 
engineer. Id. at 1^ 12 As an irrigation water right, the water must have been put to 
beneficial use for irrigation purposes in order to avoid forfeiture for nonuse. 
The holder of the right argued that the water had been put to 
beneficial use "to cultivate trees . . . and that the water was otherwise put to 
beneficial use irrigating indigenous vegetation on the property." Id. at |^ 14. 
5
 The case of Washington County v. State Tax Common, 133 P.2d 564 (Utah 1943) 
likewise does not stand for this proposition. The judge in this case merely opined, 
without any research or analysis, that the irrigation exemption was "probably adopted in 
pursuance of a general public policy designed to encourage the cultivation and irrigation 
of arid lands." Id. at 566 (emphasis added). The Court can determine for itself the value 
of this speculation; however, nothing in this language limits either the term "cultivation" 
or the term "irrigation" to agriculture. Even if the term "cultivation" could be construed 
as being limited to agricultural cultivation (as opposed to horticultural or pastoral 
cultivation), it is not used synonymously with the term "irrigation." In fact, the use of the 
phrase "cultivation and irrigation" in the sentence quoted, demonstrates that the two 
terms do not mean exactly the same thing. 
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The Court ruled that the water had been put to beneficial use for irrigation 
purposes, agreeing with the district court that the "irrigation [of natural 
vegetation] produced the benefits of. 'among others.* 'satisfying aesthetic 
desires.' 'reducing the fire hazard/ and 'creating property line buffers "" 
Id at H 53. 
This Court thereafter affirmed the trial court and rejected the challenge to those rights for 
non-use. Id. at |^ 54 
In re Gen. Determination of Water Rights is actually an extreme example of a 
beneficial use of an irrigation water right because it does not involve the use of the water 
to grow anything, but rather to simply maintain the vegetation already in existence The 
use of irrigation water to grow lawns, trees and gardens not indigenous to the property as 
in this case is a far easier application of the concept of irrigation. 
2. Books and Dictionaries 
The Tax Commission's reliance on old books and dictionaries also adds little 
support to their cause, particularly in light of the far more probative Utah Supreme Court 
case law. First the Tax Commission cites to a 1899 edition of the Universal Dictionary of 
the English Language, which defines irrigation as "[t]he act of watering land by causing a 
stream to flow and spread over it." (Tax Comm'n Br., add. E.) This broad, expansive 
definition does not support the Tax Commission's narrow definition; it contradicts it. 
The Tax Commission also cites to what it claims to be an 1895 edition of the American 
Dictionary of the English Language, which defines irrigation as "the act of watering or 
moistening" and also "in agriculture, the operation of causing water to flow over lands, 
for nourishing plants." (Id., add. F.) Neither of these similarly broad and expansive 
definitions supports the Tax Commission's claim that the term "irrigation" must be read 
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as being narrowly limited to agricultural crop production. In fact, they support Summit 
Water's position. 
The Tax Commission then cites a 1910 book, Irrigation Institutions, the subtitle of 
which declares that it is limited to "a discussion of the economic and legal questions 
created by the growth of irrigated agriculture in the West." kf, add. G. One might 
naturally assume that such a book would be limited to discussing irrigation in the 
agricultural context. The fact that it may or may not do so, which is admittedly difficult 
to determine based on the three pages provided from this 410-page book, is of little 
consequence. The same could be said of the book, IrriRation in Utah, from which the Tax 
Commission provides only four pages of a 212-page book. Even then, one of the pages 
provided curiously refers to more than just agricultural irrigation; it also references 
irrigation for "horticulture," which (at the risk of opening a Pandora's box into tracing 
100 years of its meaning), was coined in the 1600s from the Latin for "horticultural 
meaning "cultivation of a garden," and is generally defined as "the cultivation of a 
garden, orchard, or nursery; the cultivation of flowers, fruits., vegetables, or ornamental 
plants." See add. A, attached hereto (emphasis added). At best, these two books merely 
demonstrate that agricultural food production is and has been but one of the uses for 
irrigation in Utah. 
3. Tax Commission Standards 
Finally, the Tax Commission's reliance on its own "long-established practice" of 
allegedly limiting the irrigation exemption to agricultural purposes is irrelevant and 
unsupported. It is well established that the Court gives "no deference to an 
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administrative agency's interpretation"' of a tax exemption. Sanders Brine Shrimp v. 
Audit Div. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 846 P 2d 1304, 1305-06 (Utah 1993) ("It is a long-
standing principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent with its 
governing statutes Thus, a rule that is out of harmony with a governing statute is 
invalid ") The Tax Commission's interpretation of the constitutional irrigation tax 
exemption is simply not germane to the Court's analysis. 
Furthermore, the Tax Commission has provided no proof whatsoever of its 
allegedly "long-established" practice. Although it cites to the "Commission's Standards 
of Practice.'' it has never at any point in these proceedings provided a copy of those 
materials. Nor has it documented just how long ago it purportedly established these 
"long-established'* practices In fact, it appears from the discussion in the Holliday Water 
case that from at least 1931 through 1963, no taxes were assessed on the subject water 
systems despite the fact that they were not used exclusively for agricultural irrigation. 
Holliday Water, 466 P.2d at 372. The plaintiff in that case further contended that "county 
assessors since statehood have so interpreted [the irrigation exemption in] Section 2 that 
water rights, pipelines, and pumping plants, owned by mutual water companies, 
regardless of use, have not been taxed." Id, at 373 (emphasis added). It does not appear 
that the tax assessor disputed this. 
D. The Tax Commission's Interpretation Would Lead to an Absurd 
Result. 
An equally compelling reason for rejecting the interpretation urged by the Tax 
Commission is the "principle that constitutional provisions should be interpreted to avoid 
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absurd results v State v Willis, 2004 UT 93 1116, 100 P 3d 1218. 1222 (Utah 2004). This 
Court has declared "[l]t is our responsibility, when confronted by an ambiguous 
constitutional provision, to interpret the provision in a manner that avoids absurd results." 
id_ 
The Tax Commission's interpretation of the irrigation exemption as limited to 
agricultural irrigation would lead to an absurd, nonsensical, and unmanageable result. 
The irrigation exemption applies "to the extent that'* the water distribution system is used 
for irrigation purposes If the Tax Commission is correct that this exemption applies only 
to agricultural uses, then any company seeking the exemption would have to be able to 
account for precisely how much of its system was used to deliver water for "agricultural" 
purposes, as defined by the Tax Commission. There is simply no reasonable way to 
distinguish between what is an agricultural irrigation use and what is not. For example, 
presumably the Tax Commission would concede that irrigating farm food crops is an 
agricultural use, as is irrigating backyard vegetable gardens and fruit trees. Yet, in a 
backyard garden, vegetable plants and fruit trees are often intermingled with decorative 
and ornamental plants and shrubs. Ornamental flowers and shrubs are often planted to 
attract bees and other beneficial insects and other plants may be used to repel insects 
which feast on crops. Fruit trees may be planted for shade and never harvested. Some 
flowers and plants are edible but used primarily for beautification. One simply cannot 
distinguish between all of these beneficial uses and determine which are "agricultural" 
and which are not. 
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Furthermore, how could a nonprofit water company, like Summit Water, quantify 
and report how much of its system was used for agricultural versus nonagricultural 
irrigation? It could not accurately do so even if it visited every backyard of every one of 
its users. A water company can determine what percentage of its system is used to 
supply water for outdoor irrigation use versus indoor culinary use based on seasonal flow 
rates. However, it simply has no way of determining how much of the outdoor irrigation 
use is for ''agricultural" versus "nonagricultural" use. 
The absurdity of interpreting a constitutional provision to require the impossible is 
obvious. Therefore, even if the plain language of the irrigation exemption could possibly 
be read to limit its application to agricultural irrigation, the Court is bound to reject such 
an interpretation. 
E. Conclusion 
The plain and literal language of the term "irrigation" in the irrigation exemption 
simply means "irrigating land within the state." The usual and accepted meaning of the 
term "irrigation," and the definition that has been accepted by Utah courts for over a 
century, encompasses aH artificial watering of land, whether for growing vegetables in a 
household garden, watering ornamental vegetation in a cemetery, or watering grass, 
shrubs, and shade trees on residential property. 
Despite the plain language of the constitutional irrigation exemption, the Tax 
Commission has impermissibly narrowed its availability by mandating that only 
agricultural use for watering of crops qualifies as "irrigation." In so doing, the Tax 
Commission has clearly exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority. "It is a long-
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standing principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent with its 
governing statutes. Thus, a rule that is out of harmony with a governing statute is 
invalid." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 1304; 
1306 (Utah 1993). 
The Tax Commission cannot limit the availability of a constitutional tax 
exemption without clear and express authority to do so. By unilaterally declaring that the 
irrigation exemption applies only to irrigation for strictly agricultural purposes, the Tax 
Commission has "improperly restricted]" the availability of Ihe exemption without any 
corresponding statutory of constitutional authority to do so. Id. 
This Court should therefore uphold the decision of the district court and find that 
the irrigation exemption is not limited to the Tax Commission's narrow definition of 
agricultural irrigation. 
II. SUMMIT COUNTY'S TAXATION OF THE WATER DISTRIBUTION 
FACILITIES OF SUMMIT WATER AS PERSONAL PROPERTY 
CONSTITUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION. 
The taxation of Summit Water's water distribution facilities as personal property 
impermissibly subjects those facilities and Summit Water's shareholders to double 
taxation in violation of the Utah Constitution. The water distribution facilities are already 
taxed as real property though their contribution to the fair market value of the property on 
which they are situated and the property they serve. Those taxes are paid by the Summit 
Water shareholders, either directly as to their own property or as assessed to them as 
shareholders for real property taxes paid by Summit Water. Those same shareholders 
also are assessed and pay any personal property tax imposed on those water distribution 
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facilities because the shareholders pay all expenses of Summit Water under its structure 
as a non-profit mutual water company.6 Other homeowners are not taxed twice on the 
water delivery systems providing water to their homes as are Summit Water shareholders 
A. Summit Water Shareholders are Taxed Twice on the Water 
Distribution Facilities. 
Summit County receives increased real property tax revenue because the water 
distribution facilities are part of the fair market value of the real property on which they 
are sited and the real property they serve. The facilities are situated on real property 
owned by Summit Water and Summit Water shareholders and are part of what makes up 
the fair market value of that real property. Further, as a direct result of the water supplied 
to Summit Water shareholders through Summit Water's water distribution facilities, the 
value of that real property is enhanced, again impacting the fair market value which is the 
basis for taxation of those properties. Without Summit Water's water distribution 
facilities. Summit County would receive less tax revenue from real property tax of 
property served by those water distribution facilities, including a reduction of at least 
50% in the fair market value of the real property owned by Summit Water shareholders 
and served by Summit Water. This conclusion is fully supported by the Tax 
Commission's own findings: 
The district court ruled that the water distribution facilities are improvements to real 
property and, as such, are not subject to personal property tax. (R. at 2106.) The Tax 
Commission did not appeal that ruling. However, at the urging of the Tax Commission, 
the Utah Legislature subsequently amended the relevant statutes to purportedly allow the 
Tax Commission to define personal property to include any improvements to real 
property. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(19)(c). 
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Summit Water provides water to properties where, for the most part, there 
is no municipal water source available Without water these properties 
could not be developed for either residential or commercial purposes Real 
property in Summit County that has appurtenant water rights and water 
supply to the property available for use has a significantly higher fair 
market value than real property that has no water, wiih all other property 
characteristics being equal The availability of water to a lot increases the 
value by 50% of more over a similar lot without water The increase in 
market value is the result of the availability of water to the lot 
(R at 1091 H 6) (emphasis added) 
Because real property tax assessments are, and must be. based solely on the fair 
market value of the property, Summit County already taxes the value of the water 
distribution facilities as part of the fair market value of the land on which they are 
situated and which they serve. The value of water and the means of supplying that water 
are "directly reflected in the property value ' (R at 1140 |^ 7 ) 
Viewed as independent property rights, ditches and the right to use the 
water conveyed by them are property subject to taxation: but, when made 
appurtenant to lands, they have no independent use. So situated and used, 
the value of this species of property enters as an element into the value of 
the corpus or principal estate to which it is attached or appurtenant, and 
bears its proportionate burden of taxation by the added taxable value which 
it gives to the principal estate. 
Brady Irr. Co. v. Teton County, 85 P.2d 350, 351 (Mont. 1938) (emphasis added). 
Because Summit County already receives real property tax revenues directly attributable 
to the water distribution facilities, Summit County cannot tax the water distribution 
facilities again by also assessing their value as personal property. To do so is a direct 
violation of the constitutional prohibitions against double taxation. 
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Nevertheless, the district court erroneously concluded that taxing the water 
distribution facilities both as personal property and as part of the real property valuation 
did not constitute double taxation. The district court's conclusions in this regard reveal a 
clear misapprehension of the unique structure of cooperative water distribution 
companies in general and of Summit Water's operations in particular. 
Summit Water is a mutual nonprofit corporation owned by its shareholders. The 
company was founded to pool the water resources of its shareholders and provide a 
system for the delivery of water to shareholder-owned lands. Unlike a regular 
corporation or utility. Summit Water shareholders own "an actual proportionate 
ownership interest in the water rights of the corporation, as well as a corresponding 
interest in the diverting facilities, distribution works and water storage facilities." (R. at 
746 U 2.) The shareholders in regular corporations and utilities do not own the assets of 
the company at all, let alone a proportionate interest in the assets. The identity of 
shareholders and customers is also not the same in those companies, as it is with Summit 
Water. Utility companies, for example, must provide service to all within their service 
area, not just to a specific class of shareholders. Attempting to analogize Summit Water 
to a regular corporation or utility is inappropriate and inaccurate. 
Summit Water provided clear and undisputed testimony that its water distribution 
facilities are owned solely and proportionately by Summit Water's Class B shareholders. 
According to Summit Water's Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation, all of the real and 
personal property of Summit Water, including specifically the water distribution 
facilities, is owned by the shareholders who are connected to and using water, i.e., the 
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Class B shareholders. Id. Accordingly, the value of Summit Water's system is directly 
proportionate to the market value of the lands served by the system. 
The district court correctly rejected the Tax Commission's contention that 
Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (1970), permitted double taxation. (R. 
at 2096 n.4.) As the district court noted, the Holliday Water Court did not even reach this 
issue. The Court simply found that the petitioning water company did not meet its 
burden of providing evidence sufficient to prove double taxation. 
Unlike the taxpayer in Holliday Water, Summit Water clearly presented evidence 
that Summit County receives real property tax based on the fair market value of the real 
property served by its water distribution system and should not be able to also tax that 
same water distribution system as personal property. To do so constitutes impermissible 
double taxation. 
B. Summit Water Shareholders and Other Water Customers are Not 
Treated the Same. 
Other property owners, however, are not separately taxed on the value of the 
delivery system providing water to their property as personal property. For example, 
Mountain Regional and Park City Municipal Water Special Service District both serve 
water to the residents of the Snyderville Basin. Neither of these two entities is subject to 
personal property tax assessment and neither are their customers. Similarly, individual 
water systems, common throughout the Snyderville Basin, are not assessed separately for 
personal property tax purposes. Therefore, the issue of unconstitutional double taxation 
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only arises with property served by Summit Water, not by municipal or individual 
systems. 
This double taxation treatment violates Article Xlll of the Utah Constitution. 
These provisions [Sections 2 and 3. Article Xlll] of the Constitution in 
plain and explicit terms provide that there shall be a uniform rate of 
taxation in this state so that every person, company, and corporation will be 
compelled to bear, as nearly as may be, his, her, or its pro rata of the 
burdens of general taxation according to the value of the taxable property of 
such person or corporation. And it is not contemplated that, when property 
is once assessed for general taxes according to its value and at the same rate 
as other property subject to the same tax is assessed, it may again be taxed 
in some other way when the burden of both taxes falls on the same 
person, and while other property subject to the same tax is assessed but 
once. 
Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (Utah 1970) (quoting McCormick & 
Co. v. Bassett. 164 P. 852 (1917)) (emphasis added). 
Because real property tax assessments are based on the fair market value of the 
property, Summit County already taxes the value of the water distribution facilities as 
part of the fair market value of the land on which they are situated and which they serve. 
Under the personal property tax assessed by Summit County, Summit Water shareholders 
bear the burden of both real property taxes and personal property taxes based on the 
water distribution facilities. They are therefore subject to unconstitutional double 
taxation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, this Court should affirm the ruling of the district court that 
Summit Water's water distribution facilities are exempt from taxation under Article XIII 
Section 2 of the Utah Constitution to the extent those facilities provide water for the 
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artificial watering of land This Court should reverse the district court's decision on 
double taxation and find that the personal pioperty tax imposed violates the prohibitions 
against double taxation in Article XUl Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution 
DATED this ^ day of July, 2010 
VAN COTT. BAGLEY. CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
SCOTT M L1LJA 
NICOLE M DEFORGE 
Attorneys for Summit Water Distribution Company 
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